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We develop the first structural estimation of reputational cheap-talk games using
data on movie reviews released in the US between 2004 and 2013. We identify and
estimate movies’ priors, as well as movie reviewers’ abilities and strategic biases. We
find that reviewers adopt reporting strategies that are consistent with the predictions
of the literature on reputational cheap-talk. The average conservatism bias for low
prior movies lies between 8 and 11%, depending on the specifications of the model.
The average conservatism bias for high prior movies ranges from 13 to 15%. More-
over, we find a significant, albeit small, effect of the reputation of the reviewers on
their strategies, indicating that incentives to manipulate demand in order to prevent
reputation updating are present in this industry. Our estimation takes into account
and quantifies potential conflicts of interest that might arise when the movie reviewer
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1 Introduction
On that point, Socrates, I have heard that one who is to be an orator does not need
to know what is really just, but what would seem just to the multitude who are to
pass judgment, and not what is really good or noble, but what will seem to be so;
for they say that persuasion comes from what seems to be true, not from the truth.
– Plato, Phaedrus, 260a
We use a reputational cheap talk framework to model the reviewing behavior of movie
critics. Cheap-talk games describe situations in which a privately informed expert sends
a prediction about the state of the world to some receivers. The expert sends her recom-
mendation at no cost and cannot base her report on any verifiable (hard) evidence. In this
paper, we focus on the subclass of reputational cheap-talk games in which the expert seeks
to maximize her reputation for being well informed. The expert’s reputation corresponds to
the receivers’ belief about the precision of her private information. We develop a new struc-
tural approach to quantify the strategic biases of movie reviewers which arise from their
reputational concerns. Our approach allows us to identify and estimate individual reviewers’
abilities and biases. Our model has a stronger predictive power than alternative models
without reputational concerns, which gives us empirical evidence that career concerns do
shape the behavior of movie reviewers.
Movie reviewers watch films before their official release and get private signals on their
quality whose precision depends on their ability. The career of these reviewers is built on their
reputation for accuracy. Any expert assessing the quality of experience goods has similar
reputational concerns. Financial analysts sell their advice on investment opportunities about
which they are supposed to have some private information. A better reputation for good
advice allows them to charge higher prices. Academic referees in peer-reviewed scientific
journals give their opinion on whether or not a paper is publishable based on their personal
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assessment of its scientific quality. Signalling their good judgement to the editor can help
their academic career.
In all those settings, the theoretical literature shows that experts may strategically misre-
port their private information. In their seminal paper on reputational cheap-talk, Ottaviani
and Sørensen (2006) show that experts may disregard noisy signals and conform to the
prevalent opinion in order to pass for good predictors of the state of the world. Hence, when
there is a strong prior belief on the state of the world being high and the expert receives
a private signal supporting the opposite, she has the incentive to lie and to pretend that
she received a high signal. This tendency for the expert to stick to extreme priors creates
a conservatism bias. In the most informative equilibrium, despite this incentive, the high
ability expert truthfully reveals her signal while the unskilled one conforms to the common
prior with some positive probability. In this binary state setting, when the public belief
about the state is more balanced, both types of experts are inclined to truthfully reveal their
signals.
Camara and Dupuis (2013) and Mariano (2012) study a similar game in which the state of
the world is imprecisely revealed. These papers endogenize the precision with which receivers
can observe the state after its realization. In particular, the expert can make it harder for
the receivers to observe the true state by convincing them that it is low. For instance, movie
reviewers can discourage consumers to see a movie by writing very bad reviews. It is even
more true for obscure movies. In this case, the scarce audience of the movie prevents the
market from learning about its quality. Advice not to invest lead to no investment and
thus to the failure of the project, regardless of its quality, which then becomes unobservable.
When unsure about the accuracy of her high signal, the expert has the incentive to send
a low report in order to garble her reputation update. This extra incentive for experts to
over-report the low state generates what we call a manipulation bias. This manipulation
bias is stronger for influential experts, i.e. experts who enjoy a high reputation, as their
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recommendations are more likely to change drastically receivers’ beliefs. Contrary to the
case of perfect ex-post revelation of the state of the world, both the reputation of the expert
and the polarity of the prior (i.e. whether it is low or high) affect the experts’ strategies.
In this paper, we develop the first structural estimation of cheap-talk games and apply it
to movie reviews. We estimate the unobserved ability and quantify the extent of misreporting
for each expert in our sample. Moreover, our estimation takes into account and quantifies
potential conflicts of interest that might arise when the movie reviewer belongs to the same
media outlet as the film under review.
The challenge in estimating biases in the reputational cheap-talk game played by movie
reviewers stems from the unobservability of the movies’ true quality, the experts’ abilities,
and of their private signals. Our estimation strategy has the double advantage not to rely
on an estimation or approximation of quality to which we would compare the reviews, and
to allow us to recover the ability and prior-dependent biases of each expert in our sample.
The structure of our theoretical model is directly embedded in the estimation process.
Following Camara and Dupuis (2013), we extend the model to a continuum of expert’s
abilities and provide a simple characterization of the incentives to be truthtelling. This
allows us to characterize a unique set of priors over which every expert, regardless of her
ability, is truthtelling in the most informative equilibrium. This truthtelling set is at the core
of our estimation strategy. In our empirical analysis, we control for horizontal differentiation
by using data on MPAA ratings which are parental advisory guidelines that are highly
correlated with genres. The quality is the vertical element of differentiation between movies:
within each genre, a high quality movie is more likely to please a consumer than a low
quality movie. We identify movies priors as well as experts’ biases, and abilities. For given
biases and abilities, higher prior movies tend to get more unanimously good reviews. For
a given prior, we retrieve both abilities and biases using the partition of the prior space
given by the equilibrium conditions of our theoretical model. This partition consists in
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priors falling within or outside a truthful revelation set. This set is the subset of the prior
space on which experts of any ability are truthtelling in equilibrium. Its position in the
prior space also depends on the reputation of the expert. Inside the truthful revelation
set, absent of bias, the distribution of observed recommendations is determined by priors
and experts’ abilities. We can therefore recover abilities for given priors. For given priors
and abilities, we are able to simulate the distribution of reviews that critics would give if
they were truthful and compared this distribution with the one we observe for movies whose
priors fall outside the truthful revelation set. The distance between those two distributions
gives us the expert’s bias. We observe variation over time in the reputation of each reviewer
which shifts their truthful revelation set and allow us to identify its effect on each reviewer’s
bias. Our estimation strategy directly proceeds from the identification since we use the same
partition structure over the set of priors in a maximum likelihood approach.
Our estimation strategy relies on weak assumptions: we assume that, for a given prior,
experts of all abilities report truthfully their private signals if such an equilibrium exists.
An alternative for the movie reviewers would be to play a babbling equilibrium in which
their recommendations are completely uninformative. Since we observe that movie reviewers
send reviews correlated to the true quality1, we think this is highly unlikely. Moreover, as
shown by other papers in the literature (Basuroy et al. (2003), Reinstein and Snyder (2005),
Basuroy and Ravid (2013)), consumers tend to take into account movie reviews when they
make their purchasing decision. This behavior is inconsistent with a babbling equilibrium.
Our estimation of the bias does not rely on any additional assumptions concerning which
equilibrium is played outside the truthtelling set, which is fortunate considering that cheap-
talk games usually feature multiple equilibria.
We collect a nearly exhaustive data set on movies released in the US between 1990 and
1A previous version of this paper, featuring a reduced-form estimation of expert bias, provides some
evidence of this phenomenon.
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2013 that contains the main information on directors, production companies, budgets, exact
release dates, and genres. For each of those movies we gather the reviews published on
rottentomatoes.com, the reference website displaying critics from the most influential movie
reviewers. The reviews posted on this website have a binary structure (the movie is either
fresh or rotten) which perfectly matches our theoretical model. Along with the name of
the reviewer and her positive or negative recommendation, we collect the medium in which
the review was published and the date of the publication. We use Google trend to retrieve
monthly data on the number of Google searches which measure reviewers’ reputation.
We find movie reviewers’ abilities ranging from 62% to 90%, meaning that the least able
movie reviewer in our sample receives the correct private signal 6 times out of 10 whereas
the most able one is correct 9 times out of 10. The average conservatism bias for low prior
movies, i.e. the average probability that the experts in our sample transform a positive signal
into a bad review when the prior is low is between 8 and 11%, depending on the specifications
of the model. The average conservatism bias for high prior movies ranges from 13 to 15%.
For some reviewers in our sample this conservatism bias goes up to 40%. Moreover, we find
a significant, albeit small, effect of the reputation of reviewers on their strategies, indicating
that incentives to manipulate demand in order to prevent reputation updating are present in
this industry. We estimate an average probability of giving a good review despite a negative
signal of 5% among reviewers due to conflicts of interest.
In order to provide evidence of the performance of our econometric model, we carry out
an estimation of our model on a random subsample of our data set and conduct out-of-
sample predictions. We find that the predicted distribution of reviews matches closely the
one observed in the data. We also compare our model to two alternative specifications:
one ruling out strategic biases and one assuming that all experts have the same ability and
this ability is common knowledge. The first one corresponds to a story in which experts
differ in their ability but are nonetheless truthful when sending their recommendations. The
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second one corresponds to a story in which experts are truthful because their payoff does not
depend on how well informed they are. We find that our model performs better than these
two in predicting the outcomes in the out-of-sample data, suggesting that strategic biases
and career concerns do play an important role in movie reviewing.
We present the related literature in the next section. Theoretical predictions and our
empirical strategy are respectively presented in sections 3 and 4. We introduce our dataset
in section 5 and our empirical analysis in section 6. Out-of-sample predictions are provided
in section 7. Section 8 provides a short conclusion.
2 Related Literature
Technically, our estimation method follows the literature on the estimation of voting games
by building on the technique developed by Iaryczower and Shum (2012b). They estimate the
political bias of supreme court judges who aim to take the right decision between rejecting or
confirming the decision of the lower court. The main conceptual difference between our two
approaches is that political biases are exogenous whereas our strategic bias is endogenous as
it depends on the prior as well as the ability and reputation of the expert. They rely on a
two-step approach in which biases and abilities are recovered from a first-step estimation of
conditional voting probabilities. By contrast, our identification and estimation strategies rely
on a partition of the set of priors in which we directly embed the structure of the theoretical
model.
Assessing the importance of strategic bias in expert reviews is critical as they may have
a non negligible role in the failure or success of new products, as shown in Reinstein and
Snyder (2005) or in Boatwright et al. (2007). Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) show that media
outlets tend to conform their news coverage to their readership’s taste in order to build their
reputation as reliable news sources. Deviation from truthful revelation decreases with the
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verifiability of the state of the world and with competition. Their framework differs from ours
in that the expert cannot influence the precision with which the state of the world is observed.
Some empirical papers have tackled other potential sources of bias: in a detailed study of
conflicts of interest in the motion pictures industry, DellaVigna and Kennedy (2011) show
that biased reviewing occurs when the reviewer works for the company producing the movie
under review. Although we control for conflicts of interest in our estimation, this question
is not central to our paper. In particular, we do not consider the possibility for the reviewer
not to release a review and then ignore potential bias by omission. Our structural approach
yields estimates of the bias due to conflict of interest that are similar to those found by
DellaVigna and Kennedy (2011) in their reduced form approach which provides an external
validation for our new methodology. Dobrescu et al. (2012) study the impact of media
concentration on reviews in the books industries. The authors also find that reviewers tend
to give better reviews to products from the same media outlet, although they attribute this
effect to similarities in tastes. In addition, they find some evidence that professional reviewers
are less favorable to first time authors compared to consumer reviews. However, they only
recover an aggregate effect, do not attribute this effect to strategic considerations and do not
control for the possibility that professional and amateur reviewers grade differently. These
papers provide atheoretical statistical evidence rather than structural estimations and do
not quantify the biases.
3 A reputational cheap talk framework
In this section, we present the reputational cheap-talk game that we later estimate and
characterize the truthful revelation set, which is at the core of our identification strategy.
This set is defined as all priors supporting a truthful revelation equilibrium for experts of all
abilities.
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Setup Expert’s phase Determination of τ Reputation update
1. Common
priors µ
on quality
and f(t˜) on
reputation
2. The expert
receives s,
gets posterior
on quality
pe(θi|s, t)
and sends r
3. Consumers
receive r,
compute
updated
prior ν
4. Make
purchasing
decision ⇒
precision
of ex-post
signal: τ(ν)
5. X is
drawn
from
Fτ(ν)
6. Update
on the
reputation of
the expert:
p(h|ν,X, τ)
Figure 1: Timing of the game
3.1 Setting of the game
We study a reputational cheap-talk game in which an expert receives a noisy private infor-
mation (or signal) about the state of the world, and can communicate her information to
her audience. In the following, we will assume that the state of the world represents the
quality of an experience good while the expert’s audience consists of the consumers who can
potentially buy the product.
Figure 1 presents the timing of the game.
We assume that the quality, θ, is either bad, θ0, or good, θ1. We denote by Θ the quality
space, Θ = {θ0, θ1}. The private signal of the expert, s, is either low, s0, or high, s1. The
signal space is denoted by S = {s0, s1}. The expert receives a low (high) signal when she
perceives the quality as bad (good).
The expert and consumers share a common prior belief about the quality of the product.
We denote by µ the common prior on the quality being high, µ = pr(θ1). The report of
the expert takes the form of a recommendation about the product. The expert can send a
recommendation at no cost. The expert cannot certify that her recommendation matches her
private information nor can consumers verify that the expert reported her private information
truthfully. The recommendation of the expert, r, is either bad, r0, or good, r1. By sending
a bad (good) recommendation the expert tells her audience that the movie is of bad (good)
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quality. The recommendation space is R = {r0, r1}.
The precision of the expert’s private information depends on her ability. A more able
expert receives a more precise signal. The ability t of the expert is defined as the probability
for her to observe a private signal corresponding to the true quality, p(si|θi) in which i = 0, 1.
t is privately observed by the expert. The expert’s ability is drawn from a common knowledge
distribution F over a continuum of possible abilities
[
1
2
, 1
]
. The lowest ability expert receives
a completely uninformative signal, t = 1
2
.
The expert cares only about her reputation, which is the consumers’ belief about her
ability, denoted t˜. The expert derives a utility u(t˜) of being perceived as having an ability
t˜. We assume the expert’s utility increases with her reputation. Furthermore, the expert is
risk-neutral, therefore u is linear in t˜. Without loss of generality, we assume that u(t˜) = t˜.
The expert’s strategy, σ : S ×R→ [0, 1], is the probability with which the expert sends the
recommendation, ri when she receives the signal, si: σsi(ri) = pr(ri|si).
Consumers can base their purchasing decisions on the expert’s recommendation. They
form an updated prior ν(s˜) = p(θ1|r, t˜, σ˜) about the state of the world. The updated prior
depends on the recommendation sent by the expert, the expert’s reputation, and the con-
sumers’ belief about the strategy played by the expert, σ˜.
After consumption, each purchaser forms her individual opinion about the product’s
quality. The aggregation of the individual opinions of the purchasers forms an ex-post
feedback that the entire consumer population use to compute their posterior belief about
the quality. Regardless of their purchasing status, all consumers rely on the ex-post feedback
derived from the aggregation of the purchasers’ opinions to update their beliefs on the quality.
Since everyone uses the same information, everyone shares the same beliefs. The precision
of the ex-post feedback increases with the number of consumers who decided to buy the
product and could therefore form their opinion about its quality. The precision of the ex-
post feedback τ(.) ≥ 1
2
is modelled as an increasing function of ν. A higher updated prior
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on the state of the world being high makes potential consumers more likely to buy. In
turn, a higher number of purchasers translates into a more informative ex-post feedback.
Formally, consumers observe an ex-post feedback signal X ∈ {X0, X1} at the end of the
game and p(Xi|θi) = τ(ν). Models with perfect ex-post revelation of the state of the world
are equivalent to τ(ν) = 1, ∀ν.
Ultimately, consumers use their posterior belief on the quality to infer the probability with
which the recommendation sent by the expert is correct and update the expert reputation
accordingly.
In this game, the expert has two types of incentives not to reveal her private information
truthfully.
(i) When the prior on the product’s quality is extreme and the expert receives a signal
that contradicts the prior, she anticipates that her signal is likely to be incorrect and has an
incentive to lie and pretend having received the signal that is the most likely to be correct.
We refer to that as conservatism bias.
(ii) Since consumers are less likely to buy when they expect the product’s quality to be
bad, by sending a bad recommendation, the expert can decrease the precision of the ex post
feedback and prevent consumers from updating her reputation. Therefore, the expert has
an incentive to over report the low signal. This incentive generates a manipulation bias.
The incentive for the expert to overreport the low signal to obfuscate the realization
of the state of the world is stronger for highly reputed experts whose recommendation can
change more drastically the consumers’ updated prior on the quality and then influence
more their purchasing decisions. Also simultaneous competition between experts mitigates
the manipulation bias since a good recommendation written by a competitive expert reduces
the deference effect on consumer demand that a bad recommendation can exert.
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3.2 Truthful Revelation Set
We now characterize the truthful revelation set, which is the set of priors sustaining a
truthtelling equilibrium for experts of all abilities.
The expert is said to be truthtelling if she sends a recommendation ri after receiving a
signal si with probability one, for i = 0, 1, that is σsi(ri) = 1∀ i ∈ 0, 1. We denote σT the
truthtelling strategy.
When consumers think that she is truthful, an expert has no incentives to deviate from
truthtelling as long as she expects a higher utility for reporting truthfully her private signal
than for misreporting it. Mathematically this condition writes as:
Ef (u(t˜)|si, ri, t, σ˜T ) ≥ Ef (u(t˜)|si, r−i, t, σ˜T ), ∀i
Where σ˜T means that consumers believe the expert is truthtelling. In the following, to
simplify notations, we sometimes do not mention the distribution on which we compute the
expected utility, i.e. f . We also replace the pair
{
ri, σ˜
T
}
by s˜i which is the signal received
by the expert as believed by consumers. When consumers receive ri and believe that the
expert is truthful, they think the expert has received si (which is what matters to update
her reputation). This leads us to the following characterization of the truthful revelation set.
Its proof can be found in appendix A along the proofs of all propositions in this section:
Proposition 1. Suppose consumers believe experts of all ability are truthtelling. After re-
ceiving si, i ∈ {0, 1}, the expert has no incentives to deviate from truthtelling if and only if
she believes that she is more likely to be perceived by consumers as being right when she tells
the truth (ri = si) than when she lies (ri 6= si):
pe(θ˜i|ri, si, t,E(t˜)) ≥ pe(θ˜−i|r−i, si, t,E(t˜)) (3.1)
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θ˜i corresponds to the consumers’ expectation on the quality. p
e denotes the probability com-
puted by the expert.
Combining inequalities 3.1 for s0 and s1 yields a set of priors for which truthtelling is
incentive compatible. This set of priors depends on the ability and the reputation of the
expert. We denote this set ICt,E(t˜). As seen in the proof of proposition 1, only the expected
ability of the expert affects the set of incentive compatible priors and not other moments of
the distribution f(t˜). This makes the analysis considerably easier as we only need the first
moment of the reputation to characterize the truthful revelation set.
Corollary 1. In models with perfect revelation of the state of the world, ICt,E(t˜) = [1− t, t].
Corollary 1 shows that the reputation of the expert, E(t˜), does not affect the set of
incentive compatible priors when the state of the world is perfectly revealed ex-post, . This
set is also centred around 1
2
.
We also show that low ability experts have less incentives to be truthful:
Proposition 2. Fix E(t˜). Then, ICt1,E(t˜) ⊆ ICt2,E(t˜) ⇔ t1 ≤ t2
Hence, the set of priors for which truthtelling is incentive compatible for the least able
expert, i.e. ICt,E(t˜), is included in all other sets. It is direct to see that for such priors,
truthtelling is an equilibrium for all types of experts. We call this set the truthful revelation
set.
Figure 2 gives the shape of such a set for different consumer beliefs about the ability of
the expert when t = 0.65.
In this paper, we do not characterize the equilibrium outside the truthful revelation set
as it does not affect our estimation strategy.
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µ
1
1
2
0
t 0.8 t E(t˜)
s1 ⇒ r1
s0 ⇒ r0
TRS
Figure 2: Truthful Revelation Set for t = 0.65 and τ(ν) = 1+ν
2
. The TRS lies between the
two red lines. These lines are determined by the set of incentive compatible priors for s0, s1,
and all possible values of E(t˜).
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4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Identification of Ability and Bias
4.1.1 Intuition
We are able to separately identify movies’ priors, reviewers’ abilities, and strategic biases. We
use the common value in reviews to identify the priors: since reviews depend on reviewers’
private signals and are released simultaneously, they are correlated through and only through
the true quality. Indeed, a high quality movie is more likely to generate high private signals,
and then good reviews than low quality ones. Holding the biases and abilities constant, the
prior is identified as movies with extreme priors will tend to have more unanimous reviews.
For a given prior, the partition on the set of priors created by the truthful revelation set
allows us to identify each expert’s ability and bias. We use observations with priors falling
within the truthful revelation set to identify the abilities. For movies whose priors lie in this
set, reviewers reveal truthfully their signals and their ability is given by the distribution of
their reviews conditional on the quality. Outside the truthful revelation set, the strategic
bias is estimated using the difference in the actual distribution of recommendations and
the distribution of signals generated by the ability. Finally, the truthtelling set may vary
according to the reputation of the expert. We identify the experts’ reputation using this
shift in the truthful revelation set.
4.1.2 A more formal argument
We now present a more formal argument for the identification. To obtain our result we make
the following assumption on the game played by movie reviewers:
Assumption 1. Experts play truthfully in the truthful revelation set.
This assumption amounts to say that experts are truthful when truthtelling is an equi-
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librium.
Let us introduce some notations:
• ri,j ∈ {0, 1} is the recommendation or review given by the movie reviewer i to the movie
j in our database. It corresponds to the recommendation in the theoretical model.
• rj is the vector of reviews for movie j.
• µj = Pr(θj = 1) is the prior belief about the movie. It is movie specific and common
to all reviewers.2
• γi,θ = Pr(ri,j = 1|θj = θ, µj) for θ = 0, 1 are the reduced-form conditional probabilities
of sending a good review.
The first step consists in maximizing the likelihood of observing the vector of reviews rj:
max
{γi,1,γi,0}ni=1,{µj}mj=1
Pr(rj) = µj
n∏
i=1
γ
ri,j
i,1 (1− γi,1)1−ri,j + (1− µj)
n∏
i=1
γ
ri,j
i,0 (1− γi,0)1−ri,j
s.t. γi,1 ≥ γi,0
(4.1)
Since reviews are independent conditional on the quality, rj follows a multivariate mixture
distribution with mixing probabilities µj. Suppose first that the conditional probability of a
good review, γi,θ, is invariant over the movie prior. That would be the case if the strategic
bias did not depend on the prior. In this setting, the nonparametric identification of the
mixing probability and marginal distributions has been proven in several papers dealing with
identification of mixture distributions such as Allman et al. (2009) as long as we observe at
least three reviews for each movie and we assume that γi,θ1 ≥ γi,θ0 . The latter inequality
2As in the theoretical model, we assume away heterogeneous priors. Identification does not hold in that
case.
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holds in our model since we assume that all reviewers have at least a 50% chance of receiving
the correct signal about the quality.
However, in our framework, the conditional probability of giving a good review depends
on the prior since the reviewer’s strategy varies with the prior. We rely on an exclusion
restriction in order to identify our structural parameters.
To precise how our identification strategy works, let us detail the reduced-form grading
probabilities γi,θ according to our structural assumptions. In the following, we denote µi
and µi respectively the infimum and the supremum of the truthful revelation set of movie
reviewer i. Although it does not appear in the notations, we allow these bounds to depend
on time in the estimation as reputation may vary. We also denote b− = p(r = 0|s1) and
b+ = p(r = 1|s0) the expert’s negative and positive bias.
Table 1: Probabilities of giving a good review conditional on the true state of the world and
on the prior
Prior γi,1 γi,0
µj < µi t(1− b−) (1− t)(1− b−)
µj ∈
[
µi, µi
]
t 1− t
µj > µi t+ (1− t)b+ (1− t) + tb+
Note that the expert always reveals her private signal if this signal confirms the prior:
the bias only concerns contradictory signals. Substituting the expressions in Table 1 in the
likelihood function yields:
17
max
{ti,b−i ,b+i ,µi,µi}ni=1,{µj}mj=1
Pr(rj) =
µj
n∏
i=1
{
1
(
µj < µi
) [
(ti(1− b−i ))ri(1− ti(1− b−i ))1−ri
]
+1
(
µj ∈
[
µi, µi
]) [
trii (1− ti)1−ri
]
+1 (µj > µi)
[
(ti + (1− ti)b+i )ri(1− ti − (1− ti)b+i )1−ri
]}
+(1− µj)
n∏
i=1
{
1
(
µj < µi
) [
((1− ti)(1− b−i ))ri(1− (1− ti)(1− b−i ))1−ri
]
+1
(
µj ∈
[
µi, µi
]) [
(1− ti)rit1−rii
]
+1 (µj > µi)
[
((1− ti) + tib+i )ri(1− (1− ti)− tib+i )1−ri
]}
s.t. ti ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
(4.2)
The intuition for identification clearly translates into the formulation of the likelihood.
Our identification stems from this partition over the set of priors: the ability ti is identified
on
[
µi, µi
]
, whereas the negative and positive biases, b−i and b
+
i , are respectively identified
on
[
0, µi
]
and [µi, 1]. Also, we can directly recover the parameters of interest of our model,
ti, b
−
i , and b
+
i , since they are related with the reduced-form conditional grading probabilities
in a very simple way.
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4.2 Estimation
We allow the prior µj to depend parametrically on movie characteristics ωj via the following
logit formulation:
µ(ωj; β) =
exp(ω′jβ)
1 + exp(ω′jβ)
∈ [0, 1]
Elements in ωj include information on movies available to the market prior to their release,
for instance the experience of the director3 (measured as her number of previously directed
movies), the production budget, a proxy for the genre of the movie (such as MPAA ratings),
whether or not the movie has been produced in the US, whether the movie is an original
production, a remake, or a sequel.
Similarly, we have to estimate the initial reputation of the reviewer as it will affect her
truthtelling revelation set
[
µi, µi
]
. More precisely, as seen in the theoretical section, µi and
µi are both functions φ and φ of the prior expectation of consumers about the expert’s
ability, E(ti). We compute these functions using the characterization of ICt,E(t˜), provided
by equation 3.1. We estimate E(ti) via the following logit formulation:
E(ti|ωi; δ) = exp(ω
′
iδ)
1 + exp(ω′iδ)
∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
in which ωi is a shifter for the experts’ reputation.
Since we need the reputation to be at least greater than one half4, we impose δ to be
greater than zero. Since we choose ωi to be a shifter for the expert’s reputation, we consider
this assumption as innocuous. Also note that we allow the reputation as well as ωi to vary
through time.
Also, to simplify notations, we introduce the following denominations for the partition
over the set of possible priors:
3Including the actors would be difficult as an actor’s notoriety can vary greatly during her career and we
would therefore need the actors’ reputation for all movies in our panel.
4Remember that the expert’s reputation is the expectation on her ability, and t > 12 .
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• IA(ωi; δ) =
[
0, φ(E(ti|ωi; δ))
]
: the set of priors lower than priors in the truthful reve-
lation set. In this set, the expert can be affected by negative bias.
• IB(ωi; δ) =
[
φ(E(ti|ωi; δ)), φ(E(ti|ωi; δ))
]
: the truthful revelation set.
• IC(ωi; δ) =
[
0, φ(E(ti|ωi; δ))
]
: the set of priors greater than priors in the truthful
revelation set. In this set, the expert can be affected by positive bias.
All these sets depend on the reputation of each expert via δ and ωi.{
ti, b
−
i , b
+
i
}n
i=1
are reviewer-specific and estimated using only the distribution of reviews.
All the parameters are estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function:
max
{ti,b−i ,b+i }ni=1,β,δ∑
j
log
[
µ(ωj; β)
n∏
i=1
{
1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IA(ωi; δ)
)[
(ti(1− b−i ))ri(1− ti + tib−i )1−ri
]
+1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IB(ωi; δ)
)[
trii (1− ti)1−ri
]
+1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IC(ωi; δ)
)[
(ti + (1− ti)b+i )ri((1− ti)(1− b+i ))1−ri
]}
+(1− µ(ωj; β))
n∏
i=1
{
1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IA(ωi; δ)
)[
((1− ti)(1− b−i ))ri(ti + (1− ti)b−i )1−ri
]
+1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IB(ωi; δ)
)[
(1− ti)rit1−rii
]
+1
(
µ(ωj; β) ∈ IC(ωi; δ)
)[
((1− ti) + tib+i )ri(ti(1− b+i ))1−ri
]}]
s.t. ti ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, b+i , b
−
i ∈ [0, 1] , δ ≥ 0 (4.3)
In appendix B, we provide a more robust estimation strategy taking into account potential
conflicts of interest between the reviewer and the production company of the movie.
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We conclude this section by stating two assumptions we used in our estimation:
Assumption 2. t = 0.55
Assumption 3. The precision of the aggregate signal X is linear in the intermediate poste-
rior of the consumers, more precisely: τ(ν) = 1+ν
2
.
By definition, the truthful revelation set is the set of incentive compatible priors corre-
sponding to the lowest ability t ≥ 1
2
. Since we do not know the value of the lowest ability
in reality, a robust approach would be to choose t as close to one half as possible. Indeed,
by proposition 2, the chosen truthful revelation set would lie within the actual one. How-
ever, the truthful revelation set converges to a line when t tends toward one half, making it
impossible to identify the ability5. We therefore choose t = 0.55 in our estimations. We feel
this value is close enough to one half to be robust, a feeling confirmed by our results: all our
estimates of the reviewers’ ability are well above this threshold.
Assumption 3 is a simplifying assumption restricting the way consumers react to the
reviews. In the future, we plan to estimate a parametric formulation of τ(ν) = 1+ν
α
2
with
α ∈ R+.
A graph depicting the truthful revelation set used for our estimations can be found in
appendix D. The shape of this set depends on these two previous assumptions.
5 Presentation of the Data
We use movie ratings by professional movie reviewers published in the rottentomatoes.com
website. This website gathers reviews from the most prominent movie reviewers in North
America. The reviews provided by rottentomatoes correspond to rescaled grades of the
original reviews’ numerical or alphabetical scores. When the original review is associated
5When the truthful revelation set is a line, the probability that an observation falls within is zero.
21
with no grade, or the grade is average (e.g. 3 stars out of 5), rottentomatoes assigns a rating
based on the tone of the review. Hence, each review is associated with a fresh or rotten rating,
a binary structure completely in line with our theoretical model and structural technique of
estimation.
We restrict our dataset to ratings by reviewers qualified as top critics by rottentomatoes
on movies released in the US between 1990 and 2013. The reviewers in our sample are
therefore professional reviewers likely to be driven by career concerns, which is in line with
our theoretical model. The dataset has a panel structure whose two dimensions are the
movies and the reviewers.
Each review contains the newspaper or TV show in which it was given, the name of the
reviewer, and the date of the publication. We only keep reviews which are close in time so
as to ensure that competition is indeed simultaneous and no herding behaviour occurs.
We combine these reviews with data on movies’ characteristics, collected on the imdb.com
website (the Internet Movie DataBase). For each movie, the dataset includes the official
release date, the total box-office revenues, the production budget, the number of screens
on which the movie was run during the opening weekend, the MPAA rating, the genre and
whether or not the movie was produced in the US. In addition, for each movie, the dataset
contains the director’s name and the number of films she directed in the past.
Finally, we include some reviewers’ characteristics to control for their reputation, namely
an index summarizing the number of monthly searches on Google provided by the website
Google Trends, and some characteristics of the newspapers or TV shows for which they gave
their reviews. We also control for potential conflicts of interest by identifying cases in which
the newspaper and the production company of the movie belong to the same media outlet.
Our complete sample contains a total of 118,208 reviews over 5,578 movies by 1,242
reviewers. The variables in our dataset are extensively detailed in appendix C.
In the following, we describe more precisely how we build our dataset.
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5.1 Movie reviewers
Rottentomatoes defines its top critic category on the basis of the size of their audience6.
We focus on the more prolific reviewers in our sample, i.e. those who individually pub-
lished more than 850 reviews7. Indeed, we need to observe many reviews per reviewer to be
able to estimate their individual abilities. 44 of them individually published more than 850
reviews, our most prolific reviewer being the famous Roger Ebert with 3,277 reviews.
We choose the reputation shifter of the reviewers ωi to be an index representing the
number of monthly Google searches for each of them. This index is provided by the website
Google Trends and takes values between 0 and 100, 100 being attributed to the point in time
when the popularity of the reviewer is maximal8.
To take into account the experts’ reputation, we have to disregard nine reviewers as
they have highly popular homonyms and we cannot disentangle their reputation from the
reputation of the celebrity they share their name with. For instance, we have to exclude a
Roger Moore, who clearly never played the role of a famous British secret service agent9.
We end up with 35 reviewers, whose list is found in appendix C. Overall, these reviewers
produced 48,278 reviews, which represents about 41% of our total number of observations.
We also observe the medium through which the reviewer gave her review and the precise
date of the review. Reviewers in our sample publish in various kinds of media, from national
6According to Rottentomatoe, “To be considered for Top Critics designation, a critic must be published
at a print publication in the top 10% of circulation, employed as a film critic at a national broadcast outlet
for no less than five years, or employed as a film critic for an editorial-based website with over 1.5 million
monthly unique visitors for a minimum of three years. A Top Critic may also be recognized as such based
on their influence, reach, reputation, and/or quality of writing, as determined by Rotten Tomatoes staff.”
7The threshold of 850 reviews is arbitrary: it gives the maximum number of movie reviewers for an
acceptable amount of reviews.
8When comparing the popularity of two reviewers, the returned values are computed relative to the
maximum number of searches for either of them over the period. Since the most popular reviewer in our
sample, Roger Ebert, is clearly an outlier in terms of reputation and we do want to observe some variations
between reviewers’ reputation, we choose a moderately popular reviewer, Peter Travers, as our benchmark
and compare all the others to him.
9Our systematic rule to determine whether or not a reviewer has a famous homonym is typing their name
in a web search engine and checking that all first results concern a movie reviewer.
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TV and radio shows to local newspapers. We are able to identify whether or not the medium
is addressed to a general or a specialized audience, whether or not its coverage is nationwide
or statewide. The date of the review allows us to ensure that we analyze a simultaneous
competition game. Since Google Trends data only start in 2004, we only consider reviews
given from 2004 to 2013. We also exclude movies released prior to 2003 as some movies of
the 1990s are given late reviews for their DVD release ten years later10. We consider that
these reviews could be biased by some herding behaviours which do not enter into the scope
of our analysis. Our final dataset shows an average standard deviation of 39 days for the
dates of the reviews. We aim to reduce this standard deviation by excluding late reviews in
future estimations.
We finally exclude all movies with less than four reviews because: (a) we need variations
in the reviews to identify the prior of the movie, (b) we want movies as homogeneous as
possible in terms of number of reviews to lift the issue of a potential selection bias from
reviewers. Our final sample contains 30,531 reviews over 2,413 movies by 35 reviewers.
5.2 Description of the Movies
Our dataset consists of movies released in the US between 1990 and 2013 which have been
granted a rating by the Motion Picture Association of America. The MPAA ratings are
guidelines given to parents on the contents of movies: they consist in the five following
different grades G, PG, PG-13, R, and NC-17. Although these ratings are not central to
our analysis, we choose to focus on MPAA rated movies because they represent a large part
of all movies released in the US. Indeed, the six main production companies are part of the
MPAA and must therefore submit their products to the rating system.
Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics on the movies in our sample. As shown by the
converted budget in today’s US$ and the width of the release as the number of screens in the
10We choose to include 2003 to keep the movies released in late 2003 and reviewed in early 2004.
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opening weekend, our sample does not only feature blockbusters but also more independent
movies. Indeed, the average production budget for a wide release in the USA is $66 million11
which is twice our sample average. Also, our median movie is released on only 179 screens
in the opening week, which is below the cut-off value above which you can consider a movie
as a wide release: 600 screens according to Einav (2007). That does not necessarily mean
that lots of movies in our sample are small confidential productions, also known as movies in
limited release, but more probably some of our movies have been first released in a few cities
to build a reputation and then have been displayed on more screens. These movies are called
platform release. The US gross profit expressed in today’s US$ also shows a diversity in the
way movies have succeeded, from big hits to big failures, with a relatively high standard
deviation. # weeks stands for the total number of weeks during which the movie has been
screened on some theater in the US. On average a theater runs a movie from 6 to 8 weeks
(see Einav (2007)), but some might run it longer, so our median total number of 11 weeks
seems consistent with this observation. We also include the number of previous movies by
the same director, which should influence the prior on the movie, and is concentrated around
low values in our dataset, with a long thin tail.
5.3 Media Outlets
We conclude the description of our data by detailing the potential conflicts of interest we
find in our sample. We follow DellaVigna and Kennedy (2011) and create a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the production company of the movie and the medium of the review belong to
the same media outlet at the time of the review. Since this question is not central to our
paper but included to show that our results are not driven by the wrong kind of bias, we do
not provide a description as detailed as in their paper.
We identify a new potential source of conflicts of interest: the Disney Media Group
11source: www.the-numbers.com
25
Table 2: Some descriptive statistics on the movies
B.O. US
(M$)
# weeks # screens 1st
week
Budget (M$) #Previous
Movies
# obs. 4821 4563 4312 3556 5578
Median 9.7 11 179 23 3
Mean 38.9 12.15 1195 39 5.33
St. Dev. 68.7 9.32 1342 45 7.18
Highest Titanic: 951 Roving Mars:
167
The Dark
Knight Rises:
4404
Pirates of the
Caribbean 3:
335
Chunhyangdyun
(Im,
Kwon-taek): 96
2nd Avatar: 821 Deep Sea: 165 Iron Man 2:
4380
Titanic: 289 E´loge de
l’amour
(Godard,
Jean-Luc): 74
3rd The Avengers:
629
Aliens of the
Deep: 142
Harry Potter
and the Deathly
Hallows - Part
2: 4375
Spider-Man 3:
288
Kakushi ken oni
no tsume
(Yamada, Yoˆji):
72
which controls the Ebert & Roeper TV show and studios such as Miramax and Walt Disney
Pictures.
Overall, only 1.4% of our observations are affected with these conflicts of interest. All
possible conflicts of interest that we are aware of in our sample are detailed in appendix C.
Note that when reviewers express themselves on several media, we only consider the reviews
in media in the same group as the production companies to be problematic.
6 Results
We now turn to the results of our empirical analysis. Table 3 and Table 4 respectively
present the movie-specific estimates and a summary of the reviewer-specific estimates under
two alternative specifications. Compared to specification (I), specification (II) includes the
budget in the determination of the prior and takes into account potential conflicts of inter-
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est. Table 12 in appendix D gives the exhaustive list of the reviewer-specific parameters’
estimates.
Table 3: ML estimates for the prior, reputation, and conflicts of interest — Specification (II)
includes the budget and conflicts of interest
(I) (II)
Bootstrap Bootstrap
Coeff. SE Coeff SE
Movie Specific, β:
Constant 1.249 (0.040) 1.124 (0.004)
Origin: USA -1.494 (0.038) -1.440 (0.016)
Origin: co-production USA -1.539 (0.074) -1.554 (0.083)
Remake -0.501 (0.247) -0.439 (0.228)
Sequel -0.496 (0.053) -0.432 (0.115)
Number of director’s previous films 0.016 (0.000) 0.016 (0.000)
G rating 0.949 (0.173) 0.988 (0.332)
PG rating 0.087 (0.076) 0.470 (0.191)
R rating 0.484 (0.043) 0.530 (0.040)
NC-17 rating 0.690 (9.160) 0.650 (4.117)
log budget 0.000 (0.000)
Reputation, δ:
Google Search Index 5.9×10−4 (0.000) 5.9×10−4 (0.000)
Conflict of interest, bc:
Average Bias 0.055 (0.034)
# Observations: 30440 22674
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors are computed on 100 iterations for (I) and 500 for (II)
The prior depends positively and significantly on a movie being a foreign production.
Our interpretation is that low quality foreign films are in general not successful enough to
be released in the US. When facing a foreign movie, consumers rationally expect it to be of
high quality. Remakes and sequels also impact negatively the prior. The result on sequels
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is in line with an empirical observation that consumers give significantly lower grades to
sequels: in general the sequel must be of lower quality than the original work, hence the
lower prior. The same story can apply to remakes, although the coefficient in this case is less
significant. As expected, the director’s experience impacts positively and significantly the
prior on the movie. Compared to a PG-13 MPAA rating, G and R ratings impact positively
the prior whereas PG and NC-17 are not significant. We use these ratings as controls for
the content of the movies. Surprisingly, the budget has no strong impact on the prior. Our
interpretation is that the gains from a larger budget, i.e. better actors, special effects, etc.,
might be counterbalanced by a loss in originality and quality from big productions.
The coefficient on the Google search index is quite small and suggests that consumers’
manipulation by movie reviewers is limited. With such a coefficient, only Roger Ebert would
have had a real shot at decreasing demand to maintain his reputation, but as the estimates
of his negative bias suggests, he did not use this mechanism. However, this result means
the model with endogenous realization of the state of the world is a better fit to the data
than the model in which we learn the state of the world at the end of the game. Indeed, the
estimates do suggest that the truthful revelation set is shifted towards high prior movies if
the reputation is high enough. If experts were not able to manipulate demand, δˆ would have
been equal to zero.
The small amplitude of the effect might be an artifact of two assumptions: (a) the
linearity of the precision of the aggregate signal, (b) the implicit assumption that movie
reviewers operate in autarkic markets. To check the robustness of our findings, we can (a)
estimate the precision of the aggregate signal as a function of the prior and the reviews, (b)
estimate a model in which movie reviewing is part of a competitive market12.
Finally, we find a positive bias due to conflict of interest. This bias is quite large since
12In that case, the fact that we exclude movies with less than four reviews necessarily leads to an under-
estimation of the feasibility of manipulation.
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reviewers turn a bad review into a good one 5% of the time when reviewing a movie from
the same media outlet. It is significant at an 11% level.
All our estimates are robust to the change in specification from (I) to (II). This is in
line with the fact that the budget has no effect on the prior and that conflicts of interest
should also be independent from the movie prior.
Table 4: Summary of ML estimates for reviewer-specific parameters — Specification (II)
includes the budget and conflicts of interest
(I) (II)
t b− b+ t b− b+
Median 0.78 0.04 0.11 0.77 0.08 0.11
Mean 0.77 0.08 0.15 0.77 0.011 0.13
St. Dev. 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.06 0.011 0.13
Highest ability Robert Denerstein: 0.898 0.107 0.001 0.898 0.146 0.013
(0.009) (0.035) (0.034) (0.021) (0.062) (0.042)
Lowest ability Kyle Smith: 0.619 0.345 0.000 0.654 0.363 0.000
(0.015) (0.047) (0.000) (0.026) (0.065) (0.000)
# Observations: 30440 22674
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors are computed on 100 iterations for (I) and 500 for (II)
Table 4 summarizes our findings on the reviewer-specific parameters, i.e. their ability,
negative bias, and positive bias. First, all the estimates are robust to the change in specifi-
cations: the number of instances in which we have a conflict of interest is probably too small
to bias the estimates of b− and b+ in (I). The average ability of experts in our sample is
quite high, with movie reviewers being able to correctly observe the quality of a movie 78%
of the time. The average positive and negative biases are significant with reviewers reporting
a negative opinion after receiving a positive signal and vice versa respectively 8% and 15%
of the time.
The highest ability reviewer, Robert Denerstein, is very efficient, with a precision of 90%
and no bias on high prior movies. However, for low prior movies, he will send a bad review
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after observing a positive signal 11% of the time. Kyle Smith, the lowest ability reviewer,
only observe the accurate signal 62% of the time and has a strong negative bias of 34%.
A surprising feature of our results is that some reviewers are apparently strongly polar-
ized, i.e. they are either prone to negative criticism or to positive criticism. For instance,
Liam Lacey has a strong negative bias of 41%. But he is truthtelling for movies with positive
priors. On the opposite, Joe Baltake is completely truthtelling for low prior movies, but has
a strong positive bias of 43% for high prior movies. Whether or not these differences are due
to different personal tastes towards negative or positive criticism, indications that reviewers
are heterogeneous in their abilities to recognize high and low qualities, or mere features of
the strategies played at equilibrium, is to this point unknown to us.
Finally, it does seem that more able experts are less prone to bias: we find a slightly
negative relationship between bias and ability. However, having observations on only 35
reviewers, this relationship is not significant.
7 Out-of-sample Predictions
In this section, we test the predictive power of our model. We find that the predicted
distribution of reviews is very close to the distribution of reviews observed in the data.
Our model also better fits out-of-sample data than two alternative models: one ruling out
strategic biases and one assuming that all experts are equally well informed and that their
ability is common knowledge.
7.1 Testing Predictive Power
Applying our model’s estimates to new data, i.e. new movies, we can recover the priors
on their quality but also the ex-ante probability, i.e. prior to observing the private signal,
that a particular reviewer gives a good or bad review to a movie. However, we only observe
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the realization of this ex-ante distribution, which is the final review. Testing the predictive
power of our model is therefore difficult since we cannot directly compare the estimated and
realized outcomes.
To overcome this difficulty, we group together observations, i.e. couples of movie and
movie reviewer, for which our model predicts similar probabilities of good reviews. Within
each group, we then compute the actual proportion of good reviews which corresponds to
the observed probability of a good review conditional on belonging to the group. With this
method, we cannot generally conclude that a model with similar predicted and observed
probabilities is a good predictor13, however we can rule out models whose predicted proba-
bilities differ widely from the actual ones.
We provide an additional proof of the relevance of our model by comparing its predictive
power to the one of alternative models. To achieve this goal we compute the confusion
matrix of our model: for each movie-movie reviewer couple in our out-of-sample data, we
draw a realization of the review from our estimated ex-ante distribution of giving a good or
a bad review. We then compare this realization to the actual review given by the reviewer.
If they are similar, we say our model classified the observation correctly. Repeating that
several times, we can obtain an average classification ratio. Doing that same operation for
alternative models, the best one has the highest average classification ratio.
7.1.1 Out-of-sample Data
We randomly split our main data set used in section 6 and estimate our model on 80%
of the movies in our sample. The 20% remaining, which form our out-of-sample data set,
are used to test the out-of-sample predictive power of our model. Out of the 1661 movies
and 22674 reviews in the main data set, the out-of-sample data set contains 351 movies
13Especially if the rule allocating an observation to a group is too coarse. For instance, if we take all
observations in one group, the average review in the main data is a pretty good estimator of the average
review in the out-of-sample data.
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for a total of 4792 reviews. This out-of-sample dataset needs to be representative. This
is in theory ensured by the fact that it is constructed randomly. As additional evidence,
table 5 shows that moments of several variables are similar between our main data set and
the out-of-sample data set.
Table 5: Comparison of Moments between the Main Data Set and the Data Set Used for
Out-of-sample Predictions
Main Out-of-sample
Avg. Budget (M$) 43.7 41.9
Director’s Avg. Number of Previous Movies 6.50 6.95
Freq. of US productions 57.3% 57.0 %
Avg. Number of Reviews 13.65 13.65
Freq. of Good Reviews 49% 48%
Proportion of movies released in:
2003 2.1% 4.3%
2004 11.3% 12.0%
2005 12.5% 10.3%
2006 12.3% 12.3%
2007 11.6% 10.5%
2008 11.4% 11.7%
2009 10.7% 10.3%
2010 9.3% 10.8%
2011 10.3% 8.8%
2012 7.2% 7.4%
2013 1.4% 1.7%
7.1.2 Model Specifications
Our main econometric model is model (II) from section 6. It includes the budget in the prior
of the movies and potential conflicts of interest which can arise when the movie’s production
company and the reviewer’s newspaper or show belong to the same production company. To
carry out out-of-sample predictions, we need to estimate this model again using our restricted
data set. Estimates are reported in tables 13 and 14 of appendix D and are remarkably close
32
to the ones using the full data set.
We compare this model to alternative theories. The first one, called model (III), assumes
that reviewers have a private ability and observe a private signal but are always truthful.
Model (III) is therefore a model excluding strategic biases. We estimate the parameters of
this model by maximizing the following likelihood:
max
{ti}ni=1,β
∑
j
log
[
µ(ωj; β)
n∏
i=1
[
trii (1−ti)1−ri
]
+(1−µ(ωj; β))
n∏
i=1
[
(1−ti)rit1−rii
]]
s.t. ti ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
The second one, called model (IV), assumes that reviewers observe a private signal which
depends solely on the publicly observable prior plus an i.i.d. noise, which is independent
from their ability. In this model, reviewers also reveal truthfully their signal since their
pay-off does not depend on their reputation for being well informed. Consequently, reviews
follow the prior distribution, which we can estimate using a simple logit approach.
Estimates for the two alternative models are reported in tables 13 and 14 of appendix D.
7.2 Out-of-sample Fit and Classification Power
Our first approach consists in computing the ex-ante distribution of good and bad reviews
as predicted by our model (II) for each observation in our out-of-sample data and grouping
together the observations for which our model predicts a similar distribution of reviews.
We then compare the predicted probabilities of good and bad reviews with the frequencies
observed in each groups. Table 6 and figure 3 show that our model performs quite well
according to this criterion. In table 6, we group predicted probabilities of good reviews by
increments of 10%. For each group with a non-negligible amount of observations except one,
the differences between the predicted and observed probabilities of a good review are less
than 5%. The only exception arises in [0.5, 0.6], in which the difference is around 8%.
In figure 3, out-of-sample observations are sorted horizontally according to their predicted
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Table 6: Predicted Probabilities of Good Reviews and their Observed Frequency in the Data
Avg. Predicted Observed
̂P (ri,j = 1) # Probability of Freq. of
∈ Obser. a Good Review Good Reviews
[0, 0.1] 0 — —
[0.1, 0.2] 1 18.73% 0
[0.2, 0.3] 88 26.37% 29.55%
[0.3, 0.4] 678 35.80% 39.38%
[0.4, 0.5] 1319 44.70% 47.38%
[0.5, 0.6] 1194 55.27% 47.32%
[0.6, 0.7] 1112 64.91% 66.19%
[0.7, 0.8] 356 74.70% 76.97%
[0.8, 0.9] 44 81.40% 77.27%
[0.9, 1] 0 — —
probabilities of good reviews. The red curve represents a non-parametric fit of the actual
proportion of good reviews. Groups here are defined by the kernel of the fit and the closer
the red curve is to the 45-degree line, the better our model is at predicting reviews.
We now compare confusion matrices for our model and for alternative models, namely
(III) and (IV). Elements of the matrix are the number of observations corresponding to the
predicted and observed outcomes. The overall classification ratio is similarly defined as the
number of observations properly predicted over the total number of observations. A high
classification ratio is indicative of a high predictive power. Figure 4 and table 7 respectively
presents the confusion matrices and classification ratios averaged over 100 repetitions for the
three models under study.
Table 7: Classification Ratios Averaged over 100 Repetitions for Models (II), (III), and (IV)
(II) (III) (IV)
Overall Classification Ratio 0.531 0.515 0.519
Classification Ratio on Good Reviews 0.558 0.513 0.555
Classification Ratio on Bad Reviews 0.501 0.518 0.479
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Figure 3: Observed Proportion of Good Reviews given their Predicted Probability — The
red line displays the non-parametric fit of the observed proportion of good reviews. The
shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval of this fit. The black plain line is the 45
degree line. The black dotted line represents the 95% confidence interval for the predicted
distribution.
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Predicted
0 1 0 1 0 1
Observed
0
[
1134.5 1130.5
]
0
[
1174.2 1090.8
]
0
[
1085 1180
]
1 1117 1410 1 1231.8 1295.2 1 1124.1 1402.9
Model (II) Model (III) Model (IV)
Figure 4: Confusion Matrices Averaged over 100 Repetitions for Models (II), (III), and (IV)
— The first row and column of each matrix respectively represent observed and predicted
bad reviews. The second row and column are similarly defined for good reviews.
Classification ratios are generally quite low. This is to be expected given that for a large
part of our observations, our models predict probabilities of good reviews around one half.
In this situation, the model misclassifies an observation one half of the time. This tool
is therefore relevant only insofar as it allows us to compare several models. Despite some
issues with the classification of bad reviews, with an overall classification ratio of 0.53, our
model performs better than the alternative specifications. In addition to the good fit of
predicted probabilities of good reviews to observed ones, this is a good indicator that models
of expertise with reputational concerns and strategic biases best describe the behavior of
movie reviewers.
8 Conclusion
We estimate the strategic incentives of experts to send biased recommendations using movie
reviews. In our model, experts want to maximize their reputation as good predictors of the
state of the world. Bias in this case can take two forms: experts can disregard contradictory
signals because they are noisy, and they can send negative recommendations to discourage
demand and hinder the update on their reputation. In this situation, expert bias depends
both on the prior on the state of the world and on the expert through her ability and
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reputation.
To tackle these issues, and the fact that the state of the world, abilities, and private
signals are not observable, we introduce new identification and estimation strategies. The
prior is identified by the fact that signals, and therefore reviews, are correlated through the
unobservable true quality. The experts’ abilities are identified by the fact that experts are
unbiased on a subset of the priors. Outside this subset, the difference between the actual
distribution of the expert’s reviews and the one generated by a truthtelling expert with the
same ability gives us the bias. The estimation is a straightforward one-step process, which
allows us to recover the determinants of the prior, the relative impact of the reputation, any
bias due to a conflict of interest, and the ability and biases of each expert in our sample.
We find strong variations in movie reviewers’ abilities and biases. The average negative
and positive biases in our sample are strong and significant, with information manipulation
occurring on average 10% of the time. Also, we find a small but significant impact of
reputation validating models with endogenous realization of the state of the world at the
expense of models in which it is revealed.
We devote to future research the introduction of heterogeneous abilities to recognize high
quality and low quality movies, the case of competitive review markets, the estimation of
the precision of the aggregate signal, and a fully structural estimation of the reputation.
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Appendix
Appendix A provides the proofs of the propositions in section 3. Appendix B details
the estimation strategy in the presence of conflicts of interest. Appendix C gives a deeper
description of our dataset. Finally, appendix D completes the exposition of our results with
the exhaustive list of estimates for the reviewer-specific parameters.
A Proofs of the Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We need to characterize the experts’ incentive to be truthtelling when the market thinks she
is. Therefore, we assume in this proof that the belief of the market on the strategy of the
expert is σ˜ = σT . Given this, an expert sending a recommendation ri is perceived by the
consumers as having private information s˜i. The truthtelling incentive is satisfied as long as
revealing si yields a higher expected utility:
Ef (u(t˜)|si, s˜i, t) ≥ Ef (u(t˜)|si, s˜−i, t)
⇔
∫ t
t
u(t˜)dF (t˜|si, s˜i, t) ≥
∫ t
t
u(t˜)dF (t˜|si, s˜−i, t) (A.1)
in which F (t˜|si, s˜, t) is the expert’s expectation of her reputation update by consumers after
sending a recommendation r = s˜.
Denoting f the density associated to F , we get:
f(t˜|si, s˜, t) = f(t˜|s˜, θi)pe(θ˜i|si, s˜, t,E(t˜)) + f(t˜|s˜, θ−i)pe(θ˜−i|si, s˜, t,E(t˜))
In this equation, pe(θ˜|si, s˜, t,E(t˜)) is the expert’s expectation on the consumers’ belief
on the state of the world at the end of the game. Notice that this expectation does not
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depend on the whole prior belief on the expert’s ability f(t˜) but only on its first moment
E(t˜). Indeed, f(t˜) only affect pe(θ˜|si, s˜, t) through the consumers’ intermediate posterior
after observing the recommendation of the expert: p(θi|s˜i) = E(t˜)p(θi)
E(t˜)p(θi)+(1−E(t˜))p(θ−i) .
The reputation conditional on s˜ and θi is updated as follows:

f(t˜|s˜i, θi) = p(s˜i|θi,t˜)f(t˜|θi)∫ t
t p(s˜i|θi,t˜)f(t˜|θi)dt˜
= t˜f(t˜)
E(t˜)
f(t˜|s˜−i, θi) = (1−t˜)f(t˜)1−E(t˜)
Substituting these expressions in inequality A.1 yields:
∫ t
t
u(t˜)
(
t˜f(t˜)
E(t˜)
− (1− t˜)f(t˜)
1−E(t˜)
)[
pe(θ˜i|si, s˜i, t,E(t˜))− pe(θ˜−i|si, s˜−i, t,E(t˜))
]
dt˜ ≥ 0
⇔ p
e(θ˜i|si, s˜i, t,E(t˜))− pe(θ˜−i|si, s˜−i, t,E(t˜))
E(t˜)(1−E(t˜))
∫ t
t
t˜
(
t˜−E(t˜)) f(t˜)dt˜ ≥ 0
⇔ pe(θ˜i|si, s˜i, t,E(t˜))− pe(θ˜−i|si, s˜−i, t,E(t˜)) ≥ 0
in which the second inequality follows from u(t˜) = t˜ and the last one is given by:
∫ t
t
t˜
(
t˜−E(t˜)) f(t˜)dt˜ = ∫ t
t
t˜2f(t˜)dt˜−E(t˜)
∫ t
t
t˜f(t˜)dt˜ = E(t˜2)−E(t˜)2 ≥ 0
A.2 Proof of Corollary 1
When τ(ν) = 1∀ν , pe(θ˜|s, s˜, t,E(t˜)) = p(θ|s, t), therefore the characterization is equivalent
to p(θi|si, t) ≥ p(θ−i|si, t)⇔ µ ∈ [1− t, t].
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let us first rewrite the characterization of the incentive compatibility condition. To simplify
notations, we omit t and E(t˜) in pe(θ˜i|si, s˜i, t,E(t˜)):
pe(θ˜i|si, s˜i) ≥ pe(θ˜−i|si, s˜−i)
⇔p(Xi|si, s˜i)p(θ˜i|Xi, s˜i) + p(X−i|si, s˜i)p(θ˜i|X−i, s˜i) ≥
p(Xi|si, s˜−i)p(θ˜−i|Xi, s˜−i) + p(X−i|si, s˜−i)p(θ˜−i|X−i, s˜−i)
⇔ [(2τ(ν(s˜i))− 1)p(θi|si, t) + 1− τ(ν(s˜i))] p(θ˜i|Xi, s˜i)+
[(1− 2τ(ν(s˜i)))p(θi|si, t) + τ(ν(s˜i))] p(θ˜i|X−i, s˜i) ≥
[(2τ(ν(s˜−i))− 1)p(θi|si, t) + 1− τ(ν(s˜−i))] p(θ˜−i|Xi, s˜−i)+
[(1− 2τ(ν(s˜−i)))p(θi|si, t) + τ(ν(s˜−i))] p(θ˜−i|X−i, s˜−i)
⇔p(θi|si, t)
{
[2τ(ν(s˜i))− 1] (p(θ˜i|Xi, s˜i)− p(θ˜i|X−i, s˜i)) +
[2τ(ν(s˜−i))− 1] (p(θ˜−i|X−i, s˜−i)− p(θ˜−i|Xi, s˜−i))
}
≥
(1− τ(ν(s˜−i)))p(θ˜−i|Xi, s˜−i) + τ(ν(s˜−i))p(θ˜−i|X−i, s˜−i)−
(1− τ(ν(s˜i)))p(θ˜i|Xi, s˜i)− τ(ν(s˜i))p(θ˜i|X−i, s˜i)
Noticing that the right-hand side does not depend on the true ability of the reviewer, and
that the expression between brackets in the left-hand side is positive (and does not depend on
the true ability), we get that the inequality is more slack when p(θi|si, t) increases. Therefore,
if the incentive compatibility is satisfied for a true ability ta ≤ tb, it is also satisfied for tb.
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B Identification and Estimation Strategy of the Model
with Potential Conflicts of Interest
As highlighted in DellaVigna & Kennedy (2012), potential conflicts of interest could arise
in movie reviews if the reviewer’s newspaper and the movie’s production company belong
to the same media outlet. An example would be a movie released by the 20th Century Fox
reviewed in the New York Post, both members of the media outlet Newscorp. We detail all
possible conflicts of interest in the data section.
We include these conflict of interest in our structural estimation by modelling the behavior
of the movie reviewer facing a movie from her own media outlet. We denote bc her bias due
to the conflict of interest and say that bc = p(r1|rˆ0) in which rˆ0 is the recommendation
the reviewer would have sent in the absence of any conflict of interest. This is therefore
equivalent to a situation in which the movie reviewer plays the game as described in the
theoretical model but switches her recommendation with probability bc if she were to send
a negative recommendation concerning a movie from her media outlet.
The identification and estimation strategies are similar to those for the main model except
for the reduced-form conditional grading probabilities, which change in the following way in
case of a conflict of interest:
Table 8: Probabilities of giving a good review conditional on the true state of the world and
on the prior in the case of a conflict of interest.
Prior γci,1 γ
c
i,0
µj < µi (1− t)bc + t(1− b− + b−bc) tbc + (1− t)(1− b− + b−bc)
µj ∈
[
µi, µi
]
t+ (1− t)bc (1− t) + tbc
µj > µi t+ (1− t)(b+ + (1− b+)bc) (1− t) + t(b+ + (1− b+)bc)
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We estimate this model by maximizing the following maximum likelihood:
max
{ti,b−i ,b+i ,}ni=1,β,δ,bc
∑
j
log
[
µ(ωj; β)
n∏
i=1
{(
γci,1
ri(1− γci,1)1−ri
)Cij (γi,1ri(1− γi,1)1−ri)1−Cij}
+(1− µ(ωj; β))
n∏
i=1
{(
γci,1
ri(1− γci,1)1−ri
)Cij (γi,1ri(1− γi,1)1−ri)1−Cij}]
s.t. ti ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, b+i , b
−
i , b
c ∈ [0, 1] , δ ≥ 0 (B.1)
In this likelihood, Cij is a dummy variable taking value 1 if there is a potential con-
flict of interest between movie reviewer i for movie j. γci,θ and γi,θ in this expression are
taken respectively from Tables 8 and 1, their value depending on the prior. For instance,
if µ(ωj; β) < φ(E(ti|ωi; δ)), the expressions for γci,θ and γi,θ are taken in the first line of
the tables. Notice also that we do not estimate a bias due to conflict of interest which is
reviewer-specific (although we could in theory), because of a lack of observations.
C Description of the Data
Table 9: Variables used in our estimations, their source, and description.
Variable Description Source
Title Title of the movie
Director Name of the movie’s director
Year Year of release of the movie in the USA www.imdb.com
44
Variable Description Source
rij The recommendation or review given by
movie reviewer i to movie j, either 1 (fresh)
or 0 (rotten)
www.rottentomatoes.com
Reviewer Name of the author of the review www.rottentomatoes.com
Newspaper Name of the medium in which the review
is published (Note: it is not necessarily a
newspaper)
www.rottentomatoes.com
Review’s Date The date when the review was published www.rottentomatoes.com
Number of
previously
directed films
Number of previous films by the direc-
tor. In the case of several directors for one
movie, the sum of the number of previous
films.
www.imdb.com
Number of
previous
citations
Number of previous citations by the direc-
tor: we count as a citation the fact that a
movie is referenced or featured in another
movie.
www.imdb.com
Budget The estimated production budget of a
movie in 2013’s US dollars. We used his-
torical data on exchange rates for non-
US movies and the Consumer Price Index
(CPI-U) data provided by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistic to
take into account inflation.
www.imdb.com
45
Variable Description Source
Box-Office US Gross Profit in the USA, expressed in
2013’s US dollars
www.imdb.com
USA Dummy equal to 1 if the movie is produced
in the USA only.
www.imdb.com
Coproduction
USA
Dummy equal to 1 if the movie is produced
in the USA and at least another country.
www.imdb.com
Genre A proxy for the type of the movie (e.g. ac-
tion, thriller, documentary)
www.imdb.com
G, PG, PG-
13, R, NC-17
MPAA rating of the movie www.imdb.com
Remake Dummy equal to 1 if the movie is a remake. www.imdb.com
Sequel Dummy equal to 1 if the movie is a sequel. www.imdb.com
Google Search
Index
Index taking a value 100 the month Peter
Travers (our benchmark reviewer in repu-
tation) got the most searches of his name
on Google. All other values are computed
related to this reference point. Note that
these values are updated each day. We col-
lected our data on reputation on May 6th,
2013.
www.google.com/trends
Production
Company
Main production company of the movie (in
general the distributor)
www.metacritic.com,
www.rottentomatoes.com
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Variable Description Source
Conflict of In-
terest
Dummy equal to 1 if Newspaper and Pro-
duction Company belong to the same me-
dia outlet
DellaVigna & Kennedy
(2011), www.wikipedia.com
Format Format of the medium through which the
review is published (e.g. newspaper, mag-
azine, tabloid)
www.wikipedia.com
Content Content of the medium through which the
review is published (e.g. news, culture, cin-
ema)
www.wikipedia.com
Target Commercial target of the medium through
which the review is published, i.e. whether
it is designed for a general audience or pro-
fessionals.
www.wikipedia.com
Table 10: Movie reviewers included in the empirical analysis along with their number of
reviews in our sample, their average Google Search index through the sampling period, and
the media through which they published.
Reviewer’s Name Total #
Reviews
Avg.
Google
Search
index
Media
Ann Hornaday 857 0.88 Washington Post
Ao Scott 1,235 6 At the Movies, New York Times
Carrie Rickey 1,020 0.045 Philadelphia Inquirer
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Reviewer’s Name Total #
Reviews
Avg.
Google
Search
index
Media
Claudia Puig 1,469 0.67 USA Today
Colin Covert 1,435 0.1 Chicago Tribune, Minneapolis Star Tri-
bune
David Edelstein 1,029 11.15 NPR, New York Magazine, Slate
Desson Thomson 1,266 0 Washington Post
Elizabeth Weitzman 997 0.09 New York Daily News
James Berardinelli 2,858 26.36 Reelviews
Joe Baltake 904 0 Passionate Moviegoer, Sacramento Bee
Kenneth Turan 1,124 3.89 Los Angeles Times, Newsday
Kirk Honeycutt 1,163 0.009 Hollywood Reporter
Kyle Smith 1,010 40.41 New york Post
Liam Lacey 998 0.2 Globe and Mail
Lisa Schwarzbaum 1,633 0.5 Entertainment Weekly
Lou Lumenick 1,723 0.63 New York Post
Michael Phillips 1,157 72.62 At the Movies, Chicago Tribune
Mick Lasalle 1,579 2.62 Houston Chronicle, San Francisco Chroni-
cle
Moira Macdonald 1,415 0.18 Seattle Times
Owen Gleiberman 1,971 0.79 CNN.com, Entertainment Weekly
Peter Howell 1,260 9.75 Toronto Star
Peter Travers 1,879 23.24 Rolling Stone
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Reviewer’s Name Total #
Reviews
Avg.
Google
Search
index
Media
Rex Reed 940 18.125 New York Observer
Richard Roeper 1,736 35.31 Chicago Sun-Times, Ebert & Roeper,
Richard Roeper.com
Robert Denerstein 946 0 Denver Rocky Mountain
Roger Ebert 3,277 1100 Chicago Sun-Times, Denver Post, Detroit
News, Ebert & Roeper
Stephanie Zacharek 944 1.21 CNN.com, Film.com, Los Angeles Times,
NPR, Salon.com, Village Voice
Stephen Holden 1,050 5.17 New York Times
Stephen Whitty 1,403 0 Newark Star-Ledger
Steven Rea 1,232 1.18 Philadelphia Inquirer
Terry Lawson 1,193 3.34 Detroit Free Press, Miami Herald
Todd Mccarthy 903 3.125 Hollywood Reporter, Variety, indieWire
Ty Burr 1,313 1.375 Boston Globe, Dallas Morning News, En-
tertainment Weekly
Unknown Reviewer 2,142 0 Time Out (40%)
Wesley Morris 1,217 3.49 Boston Globe
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Table 11: Potential Conflicts of Interest
Media Production Years of Concerned #
Outlet Companies Media Interactions Reviewers Observations
News Corp. 20th Century Fox, Fox New York Post 1993-2013 Kyle Smith 56
Searchlight Pictures Lou Lumenick 74
Time Warner Warner Bros Pictures, Entertainment 1990-2013 Lisa Schwarzbaum 88
Picturehouse, HBO Weekly Owen Gleiberman 102
Unknown Reviewer 3
TIME Magazine 1990-2013 Unknown Reviewer 1
New Line Entertainment 1996-2010 Lisa Schwarzbaum 18
Weekly Owen Gleiberman 31
TIME Magazine 1996-2010 Unknown Reviewer 1
Fine Line Entertainment 1996-2013 Lisa Schwarzbaum 4
Features Weekly Owen Gleiberman 3
Disney Walt Disney Pictures, At the Movies 2007-2010 Ao Scott 5
Media Group Buena Vista Michael Phillips 1
Ebert & Roeper 2007-2013 Richard Roeper 40
Miramax At the Movies 2007-2010 Ao Scott 2
Michael Phillips 1
Ebert & Roeper 2007-2010 Richard Roeper 22
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D Additional Tables
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Table 12: ML estimates for reviewer-specific parameters — Specification (II) includes the
budget and conflicts of interest
(I) (II)
t b− b+ t b− b+
Reviewer’s Name Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Ann Hornaday 0.781 (0.021) 0.027 (0.045) 0.094 (0.047) 0.785 (0.029) 0.082 (0.059) 0.143 (0.063)
Ao Scott 0.758 (0.017) 0.001 (0.034) 0.175 (0.051) 0.741 (0.024) 0.032 (0.051) 0.089 (0.056)
Carrie Rickey 0.784 (0.015) 0.000 (0.000) 0.367 (0.066) 0.767 (0.027) 0.000 (0.015) 0.349 (0.062)
Claudia Puig 0.822 (0.006) 0.073 (0.038) 0.195 (0.041) 0.833 (0.018) 0.124 (0.047) 0.140 (0.041)
Colin Covert 0.765 (0.009) 0.002 (0.000) 0.184 (0.043) 0.773 (0.018) 0.002 (0.001) 0.235 (0.050)
David Edelstein 0.769 (0.014) 0.001 (0.030) 0.250 (0.055) 0.773 (0.025) 0.062 (0.044) 0.223 (0.057)
Desson Thomson 0.821 (0.023) 0.188 (0.072) 0.001 (0.028) 0.819 (0.029) 0.155 (0.083) 0.001 (0.031)
Elizabeth Weitzman 0.804 (0.015) 0.024 (0.051) 0.065 (0.041) 0.815 (0.024) 0.081 (0.061) 0.075 (0.047)
James Berardinelli 0.768 (0.011) 0.155 (0.040) 0.110 (0.030) 0.772 (0.019) 0.172 (0.043) 0.077 (0.046)
Joe Baltake 0.657 (0.043) 0.000 (0.000) 0.432 (0.090) 0.663 (0.052) 0.000 (0.004) 0.510 (0.101)
Kenneth Turan 0.789 (0.017) 0.007 (0.035) 0.233 (0.060) 0.758 (0.033) 0.030 (0.046) 0.217 (0.086)
Kirk Honeycutt 0.734 (0.014) 0.029 (0.044) 0.095 (0.051) 0.734 (0.026) 0.039 (0.044) 0.045 (0.048)
Kyle Smith 0.619 (0.015) 0.345 (0.047) 0.000 (0.000) 0.654 (0.026) 0.360 (0.065) 0.000 (0.000)
Liam Lacey 0.790 (0.026) 0.406 (0.055) 0.004 (0.000) 0.794 (0.029) 0.439 (0.065) 0.004 (0.006)
Lisa Schwarzbaum 0.823 (0.009) 0.000 (0.030) 0.164 (0.056) 0.823 (0.024) 0.016 (0.042) 0.132 (0.048)
Lou Lumenick 0.821 (0.006) 0.202 (0.044) 0.046 (0.025) 0.823 (0.021) 0.178 (0.060) 0.003 (0.042)
Michael Phillips 0.799 (0.006) 0.092 (0.035) 0.091 (0.037) 0.789 (0.023) 0.111 (0.053) 0.075 (0.050)
Mick Lasalle 0.665 (0.011) 0.018 (0.039) 0.147 (0.050) 0.661 (0.024) 0.003 (0.035) 0.119 (0.051)
Moira Macdonald 0.838 (0.000) 0.003 (0.009) 0.241 (0.052) 0.836 (0.021) 0.003 (0.036) 0.213 (0.053)
Owen Gleiberman 0.768 (0.011) 0.000 (0.000) 0.263 (0.038) 0.770 (0.025) 0.000 (0.008) 0.267 (0.049)
Peter Howell 0.807 (0.014) 0.008 (0.035) 0.234 (0.049) 0.811 (0.022) 0.045 (0.043) 0.273 (0.054)
Peter Travers 0.877 (0.006) 0.052 (0.028) 0.357 (0.046) 0.857 (0.019) 0.059 (0.038) 0.265 (0.052)
Rex Reed 0.670 (0.016) 0.129 (0.068) 0.001 (0.027) 0.680 (0.029) 0.224 (0.075) 0.001 (0.018)
Richard Roeper 0.791 (0.009) 0.008 (0.006) 0.355 (0.044) 0.787 (0.020) 0.004 (0.015) 0.266 (0.053)
Robert Denerstein 0.898 (0.009) 0.107 (0.035) 0.001 (0.034) 0.898 (0.021) 0.146 (0.062) 0.013 (0.042)
Roger Ebert 0.782 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.365 (0.035) 0.775 (0.015) 0.000 (0.007) 0.353 (0.047)
Stephanie Zacharek 0.700 (0.020) 0.080 (0.048) 0.004 (0.011) 0.688 (0.028) 0.115 (0.062) 0.004 (0.013)
Stephen Holden 0.790 (0.020) 0.057 (0.051) 0.102 (0.040) 0.800 (0.032) 0.076 (0.085) 0.014 (0.052)
Stephen Whitty 0.722 (0.006) 0.255 (0.053) 0.004 (0.000) 0.726 (0.022) 0.276 (0.052) 0.004 (0.002)
Steven Rea 0.771 (0.011) 0.023 (0.041) 0.227 (0.056) 0.763 (0.025) 0.164 (0.065) 0.244 (0.055)
Terry Lawson 0.799 (0.020) 0.104 (0.050) 0.186 (0.053) 0.795 (0.029) 0.151 (0.067) 0.147 (0.060)
Todd Mccarthy 0.782 (0.012) 0.039 (0.039) 0.109 (0.047) 0.790 (0.028) 0.019 (0.054) 0.095 (0.061)
Ty Burr 0.791 (0.009) 0.047 (0.034) 0.000 (0.021) 0.772 (0.022) 0.051 (0.045) 0.000 (0.026)
Unknown Reviewer 0.749 (0.016) 0.080 (0.056) 0.055 (0.051) 0.757 (0.039) 0.217 (0.102) 0.109 (0.073)
Wesley Morris 0.738 (0.006) 0.318 (0.055) 0.005 (0.000) 0.742 (0.024) 0.330 (0.054) 0.001 (0.000)
# Observations: 30440 22674
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors are computed on 100 iterations for (I) and 500 for (II)
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Table 13: ML Estimates for Movie Specific Parameters on a Subset of the Data Set —
Specification (II) is defined as in section 6; Specification (III) excludes strategic biases;
Specification (IV) is a naive logit estimation of the prior.
(II) (III) (IV)
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Movie Specific, β:
Constant 1.124 (0.010) 3.076 (0.842) 2.208 (0.213)
Origin: USA -1.440 (0.037) -0.834 (0.226) -0.433 (0.056)
Origin: co-production USA -1.556 (0.102) -0.823 (0.244) -0.428 (0.059)
Remake -0.440 (0.232) -0.594 (0.270) -0.256 (0.062)
Sequel -0.434 (0.140) -0.263 (0.210) -0.076 (0.049)
Director’s number of previous movies 0.016 (0.000) 0.029 (0.010) 0.017 (0.002)
G rating 0.953 (3.439) 1.704 (1.224) 0.972 (0.136)
PG rating 0.470 (0.201) 0.151 (0.206) 0.151 (0.049)
R rating 0.530 (0.060) 0.361 (0.129) 0.219 (0.035)
NC-17 rating 0.345 (6.490) 0.077 (1.976) 0.165 (0.222)
log(budget) 0.000 (0.000) -0.157 (0.050) -0.111 (0.013)
Reputation, δ:
Google Search Index 3.5×10−4 (0.000)
Conflict of interest, bc:
Average Bias 0.043 (0.040)
Likelihood -10422 -10620 -12144
# Observations: 17882 17882 17882
Notes: Standard Errors are bootstrapped on 189 iterations for (II) and 200 for (III).
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Table 14: ML Estimates for Reviewer-Specific Parameters on a Subset of the Data Set —
Specification (II) is defined as in section 6; Specification (III) excludes strategic biases.
(II) (III)
t b− b+ t
Reviewer’s Name Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Ann Hornaday 0.782 (0.029) 0.125 (0.067) 0.205 (0.066) 0.768 (0.023)
Ao Scott 0.756 (0.028) 0.020 (0.048) 0.097 (0.060) 0.749 (0.022)
Carrie Rickey 0.760 (0.029) 0.000 (0.014) 0.296 (0.083) 0.754 (0.023)
Claudia Puig 0.822 (0.020) 0.108 (0.051) 0.128 (0.051) 0.805 (0.014)
Colin Covert 0.768 (0.020) 0.000 (0.001) 0.224 (0.051) 0.746 (0.017)
David Edelstein 0.775 (0.025) 0.039 (0.046) 0.207 (0.060) 0.770 (0.021)
Desson Thomson 0.806 (0.032) 0.154 (0.093) 0.000 (0.021) 0.804 (0.027)
Elizabeth Weitzman 0.792 (0.030) 0.084 (0.074) 0.093 (0.064) 0.778 (0.021)
James Berardinelli 0.784 (0.017) 0.164 (0.052) 0.098 (0.048) 0.762 (0.015)
Joe Baltake 0.644 (0.062) 0.000 (0.011) 0.515 (0.106) 0.652 (0.045)
Kenneth Turan 0.769 (0.032) 0.027 (0.056) 0.215 (0.090) 0.768 (0.026)
Kirk Honeycutt 0.727 (0.026) 0.000 (0.048) 0.071 (0.061) 0.717 (0.023)
Kyle Smith 0.646 (0.028) 0.361 (0.071) 0.000 (0.000) 0.630 (0.025)
Liam Lacey 0.788 (0.029) 0.461 (0.076) 0.000 (0.011) 0.744 (0.025)
Lisa Schwarzbaum 0.822 (0.022) 0.050 (0.053) 0.111 (0.060) 0.802 (0.019)
Lou Lumenick 0.825 (0.023) 0.170 (0.071) 0.000 (0.047) 0.799 (0.018)
Michael Phillips 0.796 (0.021) 0.122 (0.056) 0.070 (0.053) 0.783 (0.016)
Mick Lasalle 0.655 (0.022) 0.000 (0.038) 0.123 (0.068) 0.657 (0.022)
Moira Macdonald 0.821 (0.024) 0.000 (0.025) 0.207 (0.063) 0.807 (0.018)
Owen Gleiberman 0.766 (0.025) 0.000 (0.024) 0.290 (0.054) 0.738 (0.024)
Peter Howell 0.807 (0.025) 0.042 (0.047) 0.263 (0.060) 0.769 (0.020)
Peter Travers 0.849 (0.022) 0.078 (0.051) 0.262 (0.059) 0.825 (0.016)
Rex Reed 0.670 (0.030) 0.280 (0.081) 0.000 (0.001) 0.620 (0.028)
Richard Roeper 0.785 (0.022) 0.000 (0.008) 0.257 (0.059) 0.749 (0.019)
Robert Denerstein 0.898 (0.022) 0.201 (0.069) 0.019 (0.043) 0.848 (0.024)
Roger Ebert 0.778 (0.020) 0.000 (0.010) 0.337 (0.054) 0.761 (0.015)
Stephanie Zacharek 0.683 (0.027) 0.078 (0.071) 0.000 (0.002) 0.656 (0.027)
Stephen Holden 0.783 (0.036) 0.088 (0.090) 0.026 (0.056) 0.793 (0.028)
Stephen Whitty 0.698 (0.020) 0.297 (0.070) 0.000 (0.000) 0.670 (0.019)
Steven Rea 0.765 (0.029) 0.118 (0.070) 0.226 (0.055) 0.740 (0.022)
Terry Lawson 0.761 (0.032) 0.146 (0.080) 0.200 (0.069) 0.737 (0.023)
Todd Mccarthy 0.791 (0.030) 0.000 (0.051) 0.106 (0.071) 0.780 (0.025)
Ty Burr 0.782 (0.021) 0.051 (0.061) 0.000 (0.032) 0.769 (0.019)
Unknown critic 0.759 (0.041) 0.237 (0.108) 0.101 (0.083) 0.750 (0.033)
Wesley Morris 0.744 (0.028) 0.335 (0.065) 0.000 (0.000) 0.717 (0.021)
# Observations: 17882 17882
Notes: Bootstrap Standard Errors are computed on 189 iterations for (II) and 200 for (III).
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Figure 5: Truthful revelation set for t = 0.55 and τ(ν) = 1+ν
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